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I. INTRODUCTION
THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRY GLOBALIZATION is quicklychanging the way nations all over the world do business with
each other. Advancements in technology offer increasing ease
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017. The author would like to
thank her family, friends, and Jeff for their patience, love, and support.
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of communication and greater access to world travel.1 Within
the aviation sector, globalization has produced a trend toward
the deregulation of international commercial air travel, result-
ing in the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral aviation
treaties between countries.2 The Open Skies program is the
United States’ brand of these agreements.3
While the results of the Open Skies policy have been over-
whelmingly positive for consumers,4 three of the largest U.S.-
based airlines, American Airlines (American), United Airlines
(United), and Delta Air Lines (Delta) (collectively, The Big 3)
have been feeling the strain of increased competition from
three fast-growing airlines owned by Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (U.A.E.) (collectively, the Gulf Nations).5 As a reaction
to the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ remarkable success, the Big 3 and
various other interested organizations within the commercial air
travel industry have joined together to form the Partnership for
Open and Fair Skies (the Partnership).6 In concert with a mas-
sive advertising campaign,7 the Partnership is fiercely lobbying
the Obama Administration to reopen the U.S. Open Skies
agreements with the Gulf Nations and to either restrict their ac-
cess to U.S. global routes or terminate the agreements
altogether.8
1 See James C. Moore, Economic Globalization and Its Impact Upon the Legal Profes-
sion, 79 N.Y. ST. B.J. 35, 36 (2007).
2 See The Economic Impact of Air Service Liberalization – Final Report, INTERVISTAS
ES-2–3 (May 15, 2006), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Economic_Im
pact_of_Air_Service_Liberalization_Final_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/952K-
NDGG] [hereinafter InterVISTAS 2006 Study]; Open Skies Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/ata/ [https://perma.cc/TSZ8-CBKE].
3 Open Skies Agreements, supra note 2.
4 See infra notes 156–66 and accompanying text.
5 Susan Carey, U.S. Airlines Clash Over Rivals from Persian Gulf, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
23, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-airlines-clash-over-rivals-
from-persian-gulf-1424737494.
6 Who We Are, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR SKIES, http://www.openandfair
skies.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/2EYR-ZDY4]. In addition to Delta,
United, and American, other members of the Partnership include the Air Line
Pilots Association, International; the Allied Pilots Association; the Airline Division
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; the Association of Flight Attend-
ants-CWA; the Association of Professional Flight Attendants; the Communica-
tions Workers of America; and the Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association.
7 See Partnership Launches New Advertising Campaign, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN &
FAIR SKIES (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/press-releases/
new-advertising-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/GM7C-Q46P].
8 Restoring Open Skies: The Need to Address Subsidized Competition from State-Owned
Airlines in Qatar and the UAE, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR SKIES 1, 54 (Jan. 28,
2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/wp-content/themes/custom/media/
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This article will argue that these measures are unnecessary be-
cause they are based on unfounded assertions of unfair subsi-
dies and injuries to the American public and economy and
instead reflect the narrow financial interests of the Big 3. In ad-
dition, the Partnership’s arguments are based on equality of out-
come, which reflects the old restrictive model of international
air travel, rather than on equality of opportunity, which forms
the basis of the U.S. Open Skies policy. Finally, attempting to
renegotiate the U.S.-Gulf Nations covenants would undermine
the entire Open Skies regime and compromise every one of the
relationships between the United States and its Open Skies part-
ners. Accordingly, the Obama Administration, and all subse-
quent presidential administrations, should reject the Big 3’s
demands and uphold the Open Skies agreements between the
United States and the Gulf Nations.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
In 1944, fifty-two countries came together in Chicago and
signed the Convention on International Civil Aviation, com-
monly known as the Chicago Convention.9 The Chicago Con-
vention set out regulations governing airspace, air safety, and
aircraft registration.10 It also established the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the
United Nations with a purpose to oversee the governance and
administration of the Chicago Convention.11 ICAO developed
“freedoms of the air,” the framework for the exchange of rights
upon which today’s air transport negotiations are based.12 Free-
doms of the air govern the right of one country’s airlines to fly
and land in the airspace of another country.13
White.Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERF6-ZLQT] [hereinafter White Paper]; see
Carey, supra note 5.
9 Gerald Baker, Aviation Law: The Montreal Convention Regulates Damages for the
Death and Injury of Passengers in International Travel, 289 N.J. LAW. 59, 60 (2015).
10 Id.
11 About ICAO, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/about-icao/
Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7U7Q-3JDQ].
12 History of the Bilateral System, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND
REGIONAL DEV., https://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/bilat-
eral_system.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NM5-MUWL].
13 Arpad Szakal, Freedoms of the Air Explained, AVIATION L. BLOG (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.aviationlaw.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Freedoms-
of-the-Air-Explained.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJP2-6KQP]. The nine Freedoms of
the Air describe the various rights and privileges relating to international air
travel that one State may grant to another State or States. Because only the first
five have been officially recognized as “freedoms” by international treaties, they
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A core objective set out in the Chicago Convention is to guar-
antee that “international civil aviation may be developed in a
safe and orderly manner and that international air transport ser-
vices may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity
and operated soundly and economically.”14 Since its creation,
the Chicago Convention has greatly benefited the international
aviation community—offering protection from flags of conve-
nience15 and free riders16 and effecting a remarkable degree of
safety and security in the industry.17 However, notwithstanding
the “equality of opportunity” language in its preamble, the Chi-
cago Convention contained a number of restrictive and defen-
sively-drafted provisions that reflected the economic and
political uncertainty surrounding its post-World War II incep-
tion.18 Representing the principle that each nation has sole and
absolute sovereignty over its own airspace,19 the Chicago Con-
vention prohibited the operation of any international flight over
or into a contracting state’s territory without that state’s express
permission.20
are generally considered to be more important than the other four. The First
Freedom is the right to fly across the territory of another State or States without
landing; the Second Freedom is the right to land in another State’s territory for
non-traffic purposes; the Third Freedom allows a carrier to put down traffic
originating from its home State in the territory of another State; the Fourth Free-
dom allows a carrier to take on traffic bound for its home state in the territory of
the another State; and the Fifth Freedom is the right to put down and take on
traffic in the first State’s territory that is coming from or bound for a third State.
About ICAO, supra note 11.
14 Convention on International Civil Aviation pmbl., Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; see also Mike Tretheway & Robert Andriulaitis, What Do We
Mean by a Level Playing Field in International Aviation, INT’L TRANSP. FORUM 1, 5
(June 2015), http://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/dp201506.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7B8-RSMD].
15 “Flag of convenience” is a term referring to the censured practice by an
airline that is owned in one country of “flagging out,” or registering its aircraft in
another country to capitalize on that nation’s lower taxes, cheaper labor, or laxer
safety regulations. Allan Mendelsohn, Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation,
79 J. AIR L. & COM. 151, 152 (2014).
16 In the international aviation context, the “free rider” problem arises where
the global deregulation of air travel allows some countries to take advantage of
the most liberal concessions of other nations without opening their own markets
to international competition. Antigoni Lykotrafiti, Liberalisation of International
Civil Aviation: Charting the Legal Flightpath, 43 TRANSPORT POL’Y 85, 88 (2015).
17 Id. at 85.
18 History of the Bilateral System, supra note 12; Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra
note 14, at 5.
19 Lykotrafiti, supra note 16, at 86.
20 History of the Bilateral System, supra note 12.
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Thus, while traditional bilateral agreements under the Chi-
cago Convention purported to facilitate fair and equal competi-
tion, in practice the government parties tended to seek the
opposite result, that of ensuring the economic success of their
own flag carriers while restricting threatening competition as
much as possible.21 In reality, bilateral air service agreements
seemed to favor an “equitable” division of revenues from highly
regulated fares that far exceeded marginal costs, with routes and
capacity distributed to the end of securing stable and profitable
operations rather than facilitating open competition.22 As one
commentator noted, “[w]herever the [international aviation]
industry remains regulated, each airline seeks to use the levers
of regulation to secure advantage for itself and to hobble its
opponents.”23
In the United States, domestic air travel was similarly re-
stricted.24 The airline industry was governed by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB), a federal agency that strictly regulated the
market by limiting competition.25 The CAB restricted routes and
set prices at a level that ensured a twelve percent profit for
flights at fifty-five percent of their capacity.26 As a result, the cost
of air travel was prohibitive for the majority of Americans.27
With domestic commercial aviation under tight federal control,
“there was a reason why flying was absurdly expensive. That was
the law.”28
In the 1970s, the United States as well as many other countries
began to shift away from conventional protectionist ideals.29 In
21 Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra note 14, at 5.
22 Id.
23 InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting ROBERTS, ROACH & AS-
SOCIATES, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF US-UK OPEN SKIES vii (1996)).
24 See David Morris, Airline Deregulation: A Triumph of Ideology Over Evidence, HUF-





27 Id.; see also Derek Thompson, How Airline Ticket Prices Fell 50% in 30 Years
(And Why Nobody Noticed), THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlantic
.com/business/archive/2013/02/how-airline-ticket-prices-fell-50-in-30-years-and-
why-nobody-noticed/273506/ [https://perma.cc/2H5H-37S5].
28 Thompson, supra note 27.
29 The Economic Impacts of Air Service Liberalization 2015, INTERVISTAS 3 (June 12,
2015), http://www.intervistas.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The_Econo
mic_Impacts_of_Air_Liberalization_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BVX-DU3L]
[hereinafter InterVISTAS 2015 Study].
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1978, the United States passed the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA),30 which was designed to promote competition within the
airline industry by relaxing restrictions on pricing, routes, and
market entry.31 The ADA prohibited the regulation of fares by
the CAB32 and prevented unlawful airline mergers.33 One of the
key purposes of the ADA was to provide the American public
with greater access to airline services at reasonable prices.34 The
ADA emphasized “placement of maximum reliance on competi-
tive market forces and on actual and potential competition (A)
to provide the needed air transportation system, and (B) to en-
courage efficient and well-managed carriers to earn adequate
profits and to attract capital.”35 The results of domestic deregu-
lation were dramatic; within about thirty years after the passage
of the ADA, airfares fell by fifty percent and commercial air traf-
fic tripled.36 In the mid-1960s, fewer than eighty percent of
Americans had ever been on an airplane; by 2000, half the pop-
ulation booked at least one round-trip ticket per year.37
The ADA prompted liberalization in the international market
as well. In the same year, President Carter signed the Interna-
tional Air Negotiations Statement of U.S. Policy for the Conduct
of Negotiations, stating that “[t]he guiding principle of U.S. avi-
ation negotiation policy will be to trade competitive opportuni-
ties, rather than restrictions, with our negotiating partners,” and
promising that the United States would “aggressively pursue
[its] interests in expanded air transportation and reduced prices
rather than accept the self-defeating accommodation of
protectionism.”38
In 1992, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) an-
nounced the “open skies regime,” an initiative created to liber-
30 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1542 (2015)).
31 Seth M. Warner, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage Restric-
tions Keep Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (1993).
32 See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat.
1703 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 U.S.C.);
Warner, supra note 31, at 323 n.85.
33 Airline Deregulation Act § 408 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1378
(1988)); Warner, supra note 31, at 323 n.85.
34 Warner, supra note 31, at 289–90.
35 Airline Deregulation Act § 3(a)(4); Daniel C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies:
Liberalizing Trade in International Airline Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259,
281–82 (1994).
36 Thompson, supra note 27.
37 Id.
38 Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra note 14, at 8.
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alize the aviation markets between the United States and other
nations.39 The DOT then set out eleven key elements of an
Open Skies agreement, which included: open entry and un-
restricted capacity and frequency on all routes between partner
nations; unlimited route and traffic rights;40 open code-sharing
arrangements;41 and expressly “procompetitive” provisions for
business opportunities, user charges, equitable competition, and
agreed rights between parties.42
The purpose of Open Skies agreements is to “promote an in-
ternational aviation system based on competition among airlines
in the marketplace with minimum government interference,” to
create a variety of travel and shipping service options to the pub-
lic, to incentivize competitive pricing among individual airlines,
to expand the number of opportunities for international air
travel, and to “ensure the highest degree of safety and security
in international air transport.”43 Some of the key provisions of
the U.S. Model Open Skies Agreement included the right to fair
and equal competition,44 the right to initiate and compel con-
sultations with the other party at any time,45 and the right to
terminate the agreement with one year’s notice.46
The United States and the Netherlands commenced the first
ever Open Skies agreement in 1992.47 Today, the United States
has Open Skies treaties with more than 100 countries from every
part of the world and ranging across a wide spectrum of eco-
nomic development.48 While many of the agreements are bilat-
eral, the United States has entered into a number of multilateral
39 See “Open Skies,” Order No. 92-8-13, 1992 WL 204010, at *1 (U.S. Dep’t of
Transp. Aug. 5, 1992).
40 Removing route and traffic restrictions means Open Skies parties are free to
operate flights between any point in the United States and any point within a
partnering nation. Id. at *5.
41 Code-sharing agreements are joint marketing relationships between airlines
in which one airline advertises and sells tickets for a route that is actually oper-
ated by a different airline. InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at B-1.
42 “Open Skies,” 1992 WL 204010, at *5–6.
43 Current Model Open Skies Agreement Text, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114866.htm [https://perma.cc/M2EZ-
3947].
44 Id. art. 11.
45 Id. art. 13.
46 Id. art. 15.
47 Open Skies Partnerships: Expanding the Benefits of Freer Commercial Aviation, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/159347.htm
[https://perma.cc/VHJ2-2CFY]; see also Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra note 14.
48 Open Skies Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/
ata/ [https://perma.cc/U7VT-NQH8].
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treaties as well, including the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on
the Liberalization of International Air Transportation
(MALIAT) with New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam,
Chile, Samoa, Tonga, and Mongolia,49 and the 2007 Air Trans-
port Agreement with the European Union (E.U.) and all its
member states.50 As a result of these agreements, over seventy
percent of international flights departing from the United States
are destined for Open Skies partner countries.51
In addition to the Open Skies agreements between the
United States and other nations, another significant outworking
of America’s liberalization policy has been the influence of U.S.
antitrust law (or the absence thereof) on the evolution of to-
day’s domestic aviation sector.52 Since the Chicago Convention,
international air travel agreements have been subject to an
amalgam of international and domestic rules that require an air-
line to be “substantially owned and effectively controlled”53 by a
citizen of its home state.54 The effect of these “nationality
clauses” is to prohibit airlines from forming independent global
route entities.55 To side-step the ownership requirements, air-
lines create international route networks by forming alliances
with foreign carriers.56 Predictably, these alliances tend to impli-
cate the antitrust laws of their respective states.57 In service of
the Open Skies liberalization policy, the United States has con-
ferred antitrust immunity on the air service industry with a gen-
erous hand.58
49 Id.; Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transporta-
tion, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 1, 2001), http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/114408.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6Y3-JBM6].
50 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation,
supra note 49; U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement of April 30, 2007, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/e/eu/114768
.htm [https://perma.cc/Q5AQ-U2ST].
51 Open Skies Partnerships, supra note 47.
52 See Gabriel S. Sanchez, An Institutional Defense of Antitrust Immunity for Interna-
tional Airline Alliances, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 139, 150–52 (2012).
53 Id. at 150 (quoting Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex
Aviatica, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 639, 648 (2011)); see also Current Model Open Skies
Agreement Text, supra note 43, art. 3(a).
54 Sanchez, supra note 52, at 150. An airline’s home state is the state of its
incorporation and principal place of business. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 151.
57 Id. at 152.
58 James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances & Systems Competition, 45 HOUS.
L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2008). While antitrust immunity for airlines has been
roundly criticized, it is inarguably a helpful tool for circumventing cumbersome
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Within this nurturing atmosphere, American, United, and
Delta have formed a domestic oligopoly.59 The Big 3 in combi-
nation with Southwest Airlines60 (Southwest) control ninety per-
cent of the domestic air travel market.61 On the global stage, the
Big 3 each belong to one of the three major alliances that domi-
nate the international air travel industry today62: Star Alliance,
anchored by United and Lufthansa;63 SkyTeam, headed by Delta
and Air France;64 and OneWorld Alliance (OneWorld),
anchored by American and British Airways.65 The U.S. govern-
ment has granted antitrust immunity to both Star Alliance and
SkyTeam, enabling them to set prices and apportion capacity for
international flights.66 Thus, while it is an important feature of
Open Skies policy, antitrust immunity also has the potential to
foreign ownership restrictions and bilateral treaty restraints, and for coaxing for-
eign governments into Open Skies agreements. Id.; see Sanchez, supra note 52, at
141–42.
59 See Letter from Diana Moss, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Anthony Foxx,
Sec’y of Transp., Dep’t of Transp., John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, &
Penny Priztker, Sec’y of Commerce, Dep’t of Transp. 4 (Nov. 9, 2015), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2015-0082-2430 [https://
perma.cc/A69K-JKHA].
60 In contrast to the Big 3, Southwest Airlines predominantly serves the U.S.
domestic market. The Dallas-based airline offered international service for the
first time in 2014 with routes to Mexico and the Caribbean. See Charisse Jones,
Southwest Announces First International Flights, USA TODAY (Jan. 27, 2014, 6:25 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2014/01/27/southwest-launches-
international-services/4938011/ [https://perma.cc/72AT-VUSE].
61 Richard Finger, Airlines Squabble Over “Open Skies” Treaties, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-finger/airlines-squab-
ble-over-op_b_6955060.html [https://perma.cc/BE66-DMXX]. With the excep-
tion of Southwest Airlines, the domestic market share percentages of the Big 3
(Delta: 16.9%; American: 14.9%; and United: 14.7%) are markedly higher than
any other U.S.-based carrier (the next highest market share percentage after
United drops to 5.3%). Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/FFT5-XWWF].
62 Reitzes & Moss, supra note 58, at 304.
63 Sanchez, supra note 52, at 152; see Star Alliance Member Airlines, STAR ALLI-
ANCE, http://www.staralliance.com/member-airlines [https://perma.cc/5WD5-
C7H8] (28 member airlines).
64 Sanchez, supra note 52, at 159; see SkyTeam Member Airlines, SKYTEAM, http://
www.skyteam.com/en/About-us/Our-members/ [https://perma.cc/LAN2-
S6YX] (20 member airlines).
65 Reitzes & Moss, supra note 58, at 304; see Member Airlines, ONEWORLD, https:/
/www.oneworld.com/member-airlines/overview [https://perma.cc/J226-W6LY]
(15 member airlines).
66 Reitzes & Moss, supra note 58, at 304.
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drive up airfares as carriers that would otherwise compete for
the same routes join forces.67
Notwithstanding the potential implications of antitrust immu-
nity, the numerous and substantial benefits of air travel liberali-
zation are clear. In the United States, Open Skies agreements
stimulate trade and travel, promote economic growth, and cre-
ate quality employment opportunities.68 They provide more
choices for passengers, improved product and service quality, a
more comfortable and convenient travel experience, and sub-
stantially lower fares.69 In fact, Open Skies agreements produce
an estimated $4 billion in savings for airline passengers each
year.70
Similar liberalization policies are now in place all over the
world.71 A 2006 economic study of the impact of international
air service deregulation demonstrated how these policies lead to
better service and pricing, more options, and global economic
growth.72 When an international or domestic market deregu-
lates its air travel industry, the increase in competition results in
new and improved air services.73 New and better services lead to
an increase in traffic as travelers respond to more options and
lower fares.74
Generally, liberalization between two countries has been
shown to increase air traffic between eighteen and seventy-eight
percent while airfares typically fall ten to forty percent.75 For ex-
ample, in less than two decades following a partial deregulation
between the United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) in
1995, traffic between Chicago and London more than
doubled.76 The Single European Aviation Market, created by the
1992 deregulation of European countries, boosted the annual
passenger growth rate from between four and six percent before
deregulation to thirty-three percent after deregulation—an in-
cremental increase of 44 million passengers.77 The implementa-
67 Id. at 305–06.
68 Open Skies Agreements, supra note 48.
69 Id.; Letter from Diana Moss to Anthony Foxx, John Kerry, & Penny Priztker,
supra note 59, at 1, 2.
70 InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at 6.
71 Id. at iii–iv.
72 InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at 1–13.
73 See id. at ES-6 fig.ES-1.
74 See id.
75 InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at 3.
76 InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at ES-14.
77 Id. at ES-16, 37.
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tion of a liberalized air travel policy by Thailand and Malaysia
contributed to more than 370,000 additional travelers in 2005.78
One of the fastest traffic-growth areas in the world today is the
Asia-Pacific Region.79 The Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN)80 functions as a regional bloc much like the E.U.
and works to facilitate collaboration on tourism, trade, and eco-
nomic growth.81 The ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASEAN-
SAM) is a comprehensive policy adopted by the region with the
goal of developing a single, integrated aviation market with fully
liberalized air travel among its member nations.82 In pursuit of
this policy, ASEAN members signed the Multilateral Agreement
on Air Services (MAAS) in 2009 and the Multilateral Agreement
on Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS) in
2010.83 Although traffic growth in the Asia-Pacific region had
already been significant for a number of years, the adoption of
the MAAS and MAFLPAS precipitated a large increase in market
share for low cost carriers,84 and both international and domes-
tic travel in the ASEAN market have more than doubled be-
tween 2005 and 2012.85
The traffic growth experienced by liberalized markets pro-
duces economic growth and generates jobs.86 For example, the
1995 United States and U.K. liberalization resulted in 9,197 ad-
ditional full-time jobs in the United States and 16,700 in the
U.K.87 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by $747 million in
the United States and $970 million in the U.K.88 The Single Eu-
ropean Aviation Market generated a remarkable 1.4 million new
full-time positions, and the European GDP increased by $85 bil-
lion (62 billion Euro).89 Liberalization in Southeast Asia pro-
duced similar results in Thailand and Malaysia, where each
78 Id. at 58.
79 InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at 20.
80 Id. at 19. The ASEAN member nations are Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,




84 Id. at 20.
85 Id. at 27 fig.4-7.
86 See InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at ES-6 fig.ES-1.
87 Id. at 14.
88 Id.
89 Id. at ES-17.
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country gained over 4,300 full time jobs and saw more than $114
million growth in GDP.90
The benefits of air travel liberalization are further illustrated
by the substantial and undeniably positive impact of deregula-
tion in other industries.91 Across a variety of sectors, liberaliza-
tion benefits consumers by lowering prices, providing a wider
array of options, and improving quality of service.92 For exam-
ple, liberalization of energy markets in the E.U. resulted in a
thirty-five percent reduction in gas prices and a ten to twenty
percent reduction in electricity prices compared to the same ser-
vices in the absence of deregulation.93 Similarly, after opening
their telecommunications industries to market forces, Japan and
Korea saw a fifty percent drop in the cost of long-distance calls.94
The deregulation of European television and radio markets cre-
ated a larger and more diverse range of options, including In-
dian television channels and New Zealand radio stations.95
Finally, liberalization of ownership restrictions in the U.S. bank-
ing sector has led to improved access to banking centers and an
increase in customer service satisfaction.96 In addition to re-
duced prices, diversity of options, and better service, liberaliza-
tion can improve market capacity utilization by (1) creating
more efficient consolidation following the increase in competi-
tion; (2) increasing productivity and innovation; (3) facilitating
the transfer of industry knowledge and best practices; (4) in-
creasing investment as entry costs go down and businesses gain
better access to financing sources; (5) improving industry profit-
ability as businesses acquire economies of scale and greater effi-
ciency; and (6) increasing the market value of businesses within
the sector by creating more takeover opportunities and thus
higher share values for stockholders.97
90 Id. at ES-18.
91 See Mark Smyth & Brian Pearce, Airline Liberalisation: IATA Economics Briefing








97 Id. at 9.
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
As a result of the numerous advantages afforded by liberaliza-
tion, the global aviation industry is increasingly focused on fur-
ther deregulation between other nations and at home.98
However, a recent controversy has arisen regarding the Open
Skies relationships between the United States and the Gulf Na-
tions. In the past decade, three of the fastest growing players in
the international aviation market—Emirates Airlines (Emir-
ates), Qatar Airways, and Etihad Airways (Etihad)—have
emerged from the Gulf Nations.99 In pursuit of aggressive
growth strategies, the three Gulf Nations’ carriers are expanding
their fleets with hundreds of new widebody aircraft, including
160 or more double-decker Airbus A380s,100 and competing to
offer the most exclusive, high-end flying accommodations to
first-class passengers.101 Already the largest international carrier
in the world, Emirates plans to more than double the size of its
98 See, e.g., Open Skies Agreements, supra note 48 (“Open Skies agreements have
vastly expanded international passenger and cargo flights to and from the United
States, promoting increased travel and trade, enhancing productivity, and spur-
ring high-quality job opportunities and economic growth.”); Liberalization, INT’L
AIR TRANSPORT ASSOC. (2013), http://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/liberali-
zation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE74-GQG4]. The International Air Transport As-
sociation (IATA) is a global trade association that represents more than 260
airlines (including major carriers from the United States, the U.K., the E.U.,
Southeast Asia, and the Gulf Nations) and plays an active role the creation of
industry policy. About Us, INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASSOC., http://www.iata.org/
about/Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/RH88-YGHS]; IATA and the 39th
ICAO Assembly, INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASSOC., http://www.iata.org/policy/promot-
ing-aviation/icao-assembly/pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/4HN7-WMVJ];
InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at v (confirming the benefits of air travel
liberalization). The study was commissioned by Boeing, Airports Council Interna-
tional-North America, Air Transport Action Group, European-American Business
Council, General Electric, IATA, the Pacific Asia Travel Association, Pratt &
Whitney, US-ASEAN Business Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the
World Travel & Tourism Council. InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at 1 n.6.
99 White Paper, supra note 8, at 1; Doug Parker & Keith Wilson, Rigging the Game
on Open Skies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
rigging-the-game-on-open-skies-1447199510 [https://perma.cc/XBV9-ERGK].
100 White Paper, supra note 8, at 2; The Airbus A380 is the largest passenger
aircraft in the world, featuring two passenger levels and a capacity of 544 passen-
gers in a four-class configuration. Airbus A380 Family, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus
.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a380family/ [https://perma.cc/96F6-7
V3X].
101 Michael Sasso, Etihad Says $32,000 Three-Room Flying Suite is a Hit with Trav-
elers, BLOOMBERG PURSUITS (July 27, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2015-07-27/flying-butler-with-32-000-ticket-piques-nyc-trav-
elers-interest [https://perma.cc/VPN8-QTWG].
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fleet in the coming years.102 In 2015, Etihad added six new inter-
national destinations and increased the number of passengers
by seventeen percent from the previous year.103 Etihad also ad-
ded fifteen new aircraft in 2015 and plans to receive ten more in
2016.104 Similarly, in less than two decades, Qatar Airways has
grown from a small carrier with only four planes into a major
international competitor.105 Qatar Airways now operates more
than 170 aircraft on routes to more than 150 destinations, and
the airline is still growing.106 Qatar Airways has invested more
than $70 billion in more than 330 new aircraft to be delivered in
the next few years.107
In response to the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ remarkable growth,
the Partnership released a fifty-five page report (The White Pa-
per) in January 2015,108 which claimed that the Gulf Nations’
carriers had violated their Open Skies agreements with the
United States by receiving more than $40 billion in improper
government subsidies “and other unfair government-conferred
advantages” over the past decade. The report also claimed that
U.S. carriers increasingly struggle to compete as the Gulf Na-
tions’ airlines expand their international flight services into the
United States.109 But not every U.S. airline and related organiza-
tion agrees with the proposed restrictions on agreements with
102 Mary Schlangenstein & Kari Lundgren, Emirates Riding Growth Surge Sees Air-
line Able to Double in Size, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-09/emirates-riding-growth-surge-sees-
airline-able-to-double-in-size [https://perma.cc/W6BR-CJAV]. Emirates’ contin-
ued growth will be supported on the ground by the completion of the new Al
Maktoum International Airport at Dubai World Central. Id.
103 Etihad Airways Delivers Another Year of Strong Growth in 2015, ETIHAD AIRWAYS




105 Media Release, Qatar Airways, The Qatar Airways Story: Charting the Rise





108 See White Paper, supra note 8, at 1. The White Paper is a report commis-
sioned by United, Delta, and American and submitted to the U.S. government. It
details the results of a two-year investigation into the funding and business strate-
gies of Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar Airways. Partnership for Open & Fair Skies,
Restoring Open Skies, SKIFT, http://skift.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Exec-
utive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YES-RLCX].
109 White Paper, supra note 8, at 1.
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the Gulf Nations’ carriers. Despite the Partnership’s frequent
references to “U.S. carriers” as a whole,110 several smaller
U.S.–based carriers actively oppose the Partnership’s initia-
tives.111 For example, FedEx, JetBlue, Atlas Air, and Hawaiian
Airlines have formed U.S. Airlines for Open Skies (USAOS) to
encourage the Obama Administration to reject the proposals
urged by the Big 3.112
The Partnership also faces opposition from European na-
tions. While acknowledging the substantial challenges posed to
European airports and airlines by the Gulf Nations’ hubs’ ex-
pansion, Airports Council International (ACI) and the Euro-
pean Transport Council oppose Big 3 initiatives, arguing that
more restrictive policies are not the answer.113 Instead, they urge
the pursuit of “a strategy to increase the competitiveness of
[E.U.] aviation, which would include relations with key partners,
including the Gulf [Nations].”114 This strategy would focus on
creating a healthy European air travel market that attracts the
thriving Gulf Nations’ carriers to European hubs.115
110 See, e.g., id. at 46–52.
111 See Benjamin Zhang, A Group of US Airlines is Teaming Up Against American,
Delta, and United, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.businessin-
sider.com/a-group-of-us-airlines-are-teaming-up-against-american-delta-and-uni
ted-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/7VFR-JAC6]; Terry Maxon, Four U.S. Airlines Side
with Gulf Carriers Against American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines in




112 Zhang, supra note 111; David Bronczek, Bowing to Big 3 Demands Would Hurt
the Economy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2015, 4:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
bowing-to-big-3-demands-would-hurt-the-economy-1448573041 [https://perma
.cc/54MY-3FV8].
113 Marisa Garcia, European Airports and Tourism Boards Side with Gulf Carriers in
Open Skies Spat, SKIFT (June 25, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://skift.com/2015/06/25/
european-airports-and-tourism-boards-side-with-gulf-carriers-in-open-skies-spat/
[https://perma.cc/NY8G-BYBC]; European Airports and Tourism Organisations: To-
gether on Open Skies, EUR. TRAVEL COMMISSION 7 (June 24, 2015), http://etc-corpo
rate.org/uploads/pdf/ACI%20E%20%20ETC%20Joint%20Paper%20on%20
Open%20Skies_June%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CCY-3VQQ].
114 European Airports and Tourism Organisations: Together on Open Skies, supra note
113; Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting
(June 6–7, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/tte/2016/06/
06-07/ [https://perma.cc/EEG8-B25Q]; see infra discussion at Part IV.B (the
proper response to increased pressures from Gulf Nations’ competitors is not to
restrict competition but to increase it).
115 European Airports and Tourism Organisations: Together on Open Skies, supra note
113; Garcia, supra note 113.
544 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
IV. ANALYSIS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE WHITE PAPER CLAIMS
1. The Definition of “Subsidy”
The White Paper begins by stating that the Gulf Nations are
pursuing economic development plans that are heavily depen-
dent upon a flood of new international commercial air traffic
through their major airport hubs.116 To that end, the Partner-
ship claims that the Gulf Nations have built “vertically-inte-
grated, wholly state-owned aviation sectors that include
monopoly service providers and complex interrelationships be-
tween their government institutions, airlines, ground handlers,
airports, and state-owned banks.”117
In its classification of “subsidies,” the Partnership includes in-
terest-free government loans, cash injections at a time when the
recipient airline was not “equityworthy,” economic grants,118 ex-
emptions from airport fees, shareholder advances, government
loan guarantees, government assumption of financially burden-
some fuel hedging contracts, and land grants.119 Finally, the
Partnership adds to the list “additional and unquantified subsi-
dies,” which it claims cannot be calculated because of the opac-
ity of the Gulf Nations’ airlines’ financial statements.120
To bolster its claims, the Partnership points to the fact that
the aviation sectors (including airlines) of Dubai, Abu Dhabi,
and Qatar are entirely state-owned.121 For example, the White
Paper emphasizes the “strong relationships” between Emirates
and the rest of Dubai’s aviation sector.122 Members of the Al
Maktoum family rule the Emirate of Dubai.123 Sheikh Ahmed
Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the chairman of Emirates, also serves as
the chairman of every other enterprise in Dubai’s aviation in-
dustry.124 Sheikh Ahmed has mentioned Emirates as a key com-
ponent of Dubai’s economic growth initiative, “Strategic Plan
116 White Paper, supra note 8, at 1.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., id. at 17 (“[A]s Figure 7 shows, a leaked internal study . . . prepared
for Etihad in 2010 indicates that the Executive Council of Abu Dhabi ‘covers’ the
cost of Etihad’s sponsorship of the Manchester City Football Club.”).
119 Id. at 12–34.
120 Id. at 18.
121 Id. at 6.
122 Id. at 7.
123 Id. at 6.
124 Id. at 7.
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2020.”125 Given the combined interest that Dubai’s government
and ruling family126 have in the success of the Dubai aviation
sector, Emirates, and the national economy as a whole, the Part-
nership concludes that Dubai must be utilizing its government-
owned aviation sector to “intervene in the market” and give
Emirates an “artificial competitive advantage over foreign
carriers.”127
According to the White Paper, one of the most egregious state
“subsidies” Emirates received involves Dubai’s two state-owned
airports.128 Because the airline’s future potential for growth de-
pends on adequate airport capacity, the government of Dubai
has invested nearly $40 billion in airport expansion and im-
provement.129 The Partnership claims that while North Ameri-
can and European airports rely completely on the collection of
airport user fees for their growth capital, Dubai’s government-
funded airport improvements allow Emirates to pursue vast ex-
pansion projects that far exceed Dubai’s current capacity
needs.130 Because funding for these projects does not depend
solely on airport user fees, the Partnership concludes that Emir-
ates enjoys a significant advantage over U.S. airlines and other
countries’ carriers.131
The Partnership’s allegations of unfair subsidies rest on shaky
ground because they fail to (1) establish that any action taken by
the Gulf Nations’ governments constitutes a subsidy; or (2) show
that any such action actually distorts the air travel market.132 In
the context of Open Skies agreements, the word “subsidy” is not
easily defined.133 The White Paper points to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
125 Id. at 10.
126 It is important to note that Emirates is entirely owned by the government of
Dubai through its holding company, Investment Corporation of Dubai, and not
by Sheikh Ahmed or any member of the Al Maktoum family. Id. at 6.
127 Id. The Governments of Qatar and Abu Dhabi are allegedly employing simi-
lar practices to those of Dubai. Id. at 10.
128 Id. at 8–9.
129 Id. at 9. The government of Dubai invested $7.8 billion in Dubai Interna-
tional Airport with the goal of expanding its capacity to 90 million passengers by
2018, and $32 billion for Al Maktoum International Airport, planning to increase
its capacity to 240 million passengers per year (roughly five times the size of Chi-
cago O’Hare International Airport). Id.
130 Id. at 8–9.
131 Id.
132 Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra note 14, at 12.
133 Dennis Schaal, Future of Open Skies Hinges on the Definition of One Word: Sub-
sidy, SKIFT (Apr. 28, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://skift.com/2015/04/28/future-of-
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vailing Measures (SCM Agreement), which defines a subsidy as a
benefit conferred on a recipient by a “financial contribution”
from the government.134 But even the White Paper concedes
that the SCM Agreement does not apply in any way to U.S.
Open Skies agreements.135 In fact, international air travel is not
subject to the SCM Agreement because it is instead addressed
under the WTO General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS),
which expressly excludes air transport.136
A major weakness of the Partnership’s definition of a subsidy
lies with the numerous forms of financial support that the U.S.
government confers on the Big 3. The Partnership vigorously
contends that financial benefits such as bankruptcy restructur-
ing, antitrust immunity, and post-disaster relief are somehow dif-
ferent from those received by the Gulf Nations’ carriers.137
Emirates called that distinction a “legal fiction.”138 Indeed, by
the standards it uses to measure the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ gov-
ernment funding, the Big 3 have received more than $100 bil-
lion in subsidies of their own since 2002.139 And by urging the
Obama Administration to breach the U.S.–Gulf Nations Open




134 White Paper, supra note 8, at 12; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
135 White Paper, supra note 8, at 12 n.44.
136 Emirates Airlines Response at vi, Information on Claims Raised About
State-Owned Airlines in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 80 Fed. Reg. 25,671
(Int’l Trade Admin., Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Transp. May 5, 2015), http://con
tent.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/openskies_rebuttal/EK_Response_Main
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RT4-B648]; see also Rudolph Adlung, Export Policies and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services annex (World Trade Org., Working Paper
No. ERSD-2014-09, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd2014
09_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST7B-F5HL].
137 Frequently Asked Questions, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR SKIES, http://www
.openandfairskies.com/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/DK86-57S
Q].
138 Emirates’ Response to Claims Raised About State-Owned Airlines, supra note 136,
at 143.
139 Id. at 143, 144 fig.IV-1.
140 Those Living in Glass Houses Should Not Throw Stones, BUS. TRAVEL COALITION
(May 15, 2015), http://www.businesstravelcoalition.com/press-room/2015/may-
15—-those-living-in.html [https://perma.cc/5YTM-WENJ] (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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A recent financial study by the Risk Advisory Group highlights
the immense amount of government funding and support re-
ceived by the Big 3.141 The report reveals that the Big 3 have
received more than $70 billion in government subsidies over the
past fifteen years.142 Specifically, the Big 3 received a benefit of
$30.96 billion from bankruptcy debt relief, which continues to
furnish an additional annual costs savings of $4.5 billion.143 Fol-
lowing the termination of the airlines’ pension plans, a federal
agency shouldered $23.08 billion in liability for the value of the
pensions as well as the $6.35 billion cost to the plan partici-
pants.144 The airlines received an estimated $5.6 billion in fuel
subsidies145 and nearly $1 billion in additional miscellaneous
subsidies.146
Furthermore, even if the Big 3 could successfully distinguish
the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ government “subsidies” from their
own subsidies, they are still unable to link those subsidies to ac-
tual market damage.147 The Partnership asserts that U.S. airlines
have suffered “widespread harm . . . as a result of the Gulf [Na-
tions’] carriers’ subsidized expansion [in]to the United
States.”148 But the assumption of a causal link between the Gulf
Nations’ airlines’ growth and purported harm to U.S. carriers is
entirely unsupported by evidence.149 Establishing causality is
141 Risk Advisory Grp., Financial & Other Governmental Benefits Provided to Ameri-
can Airlines, Delta Air Lines & United Airlines, BUS. TRAVEL COALITION (May 14,
2015), http://www.businesstravelcoalition.com/documents/financial—other-
government.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVT4-DQQ2].
142 Id. at 5.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 7. The government agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion (PBGC), was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. The PBGC is funded by Congress through private equity, insurance premi-
ums, and assets associated with the plans it manages. Id.
145 Id. at 8.
146 Id. at 10–15 (including various state-funded incentive programs, issuance of
government bonds, domestic market protections, benefits derived from the Fly
America Act, and membership in state-owned alliances).
147 See also infra discussion Part. IV.A.2 (discussing the lack of evidence that the
Gulf Nations’ “subsidies” have harmed the international aviation market).
148 Comments of the Partnership for Open & Fair Skies on the Responses of Qatar Air-
ways, Etihad Airways, and Emirates Airline, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR SKIES 1,
101 (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/08/Partnership-Rebuttal-Filing-DOT-Aug-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q8-
JQWE].
149 Edgeworth Economics’ Empirical Investigation and Analysis of Economic Issues
Raised in “Restoring Open Skies: The Need to Address Subsidized Competition from State-
Owned Airlines in Qatar and the U.A.E., ETIHAD AIRWAYS 31–33 (May 21, 2015),
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crucial to the evaluation of antitrust competition claims and to
economic analysis.150 Without this essential element, the Part-
nership’s assertions amount to nothing more than
speculation.151
2. The Threat to U.S. Airlines, Passengers, and Jobs
The White Paper goes on to discuss the perceived domestic
threats posed by the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ activities. As the
study points out, the aggregate widebody capacity of Emirates,
Etihad, and Qatar Airways will soon exceed the entire commer-
cial widebody fleet of all U.S.-based airlines combined.152 The
Partnership claims that because the Gulf Nations’ carriers are
expanding their capacity at a faster rate than the global GDP—
which drives air transport demand—they will have to take pas-
sengers from United States’ and other countries’ airlines.153 The
Partnership further complains that the Gulf Nations’ carriers
are taking market share without significantly stimulating de-
mand, which it insists will force U.S. carriers to reduce or elimi-
nate service to international routes, resulting in the loss of U.S.
jobs.154
Despite the looming “parade of horribles” the White Paper
promises, the Big 3 have failed to prove that the activities of the
Gulf Nations’ airlines will result in job loss, higher fares, or any
damage whatsoever to the U.S. economy.155 On the contrary, the
Gulf Nations’ airlines carried 1.1 million international travelers
into the United States in 2014, supporting almost 50,000 U.S.
jobs and generating more than $4.1 billion in GDP.156 And the
http://www.etihad.com/Documents/keep-the-air-fair/pdf/2015-05-21-Edge-
worth-Economics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAS3-6Z9S].
150 Id. at 32.
151 Id. at 32–33.
152 White Paper, supra note 8, at 2.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 2, 48–49, 51. For example, the Partnership claims that, “each daily
widebody frequency lost or forgone due to subsidized Gulf [Nations] competi-
tion results in a net loss (on average) of over 800 U.S. jobs.” Id. at 51.
155 Etihad Airways Response at 5–6, Information on Claims Raised About State-
Owned Airlines in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 80 Fed. Reg. 25,671
(Int’l Trade Admin., Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Transp. May 5, 2015), http://skift
.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Etihad-Response-to-US-Carrier-Allegations-
31-May-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JAD-FEYM].
156 Preserving Open Skies, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOC., https://www.ustravel.org/system/
files/2.%20Fact_Sheet_OpenSkies%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/6QS9-ZB3X]
(Each international traveler visiting the United States spends an average of
$4,300 per trip).
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orders for Boeing aircraft by just one of the Gulf Nations’ carri-
ers has sustained more than 200,000 U.S. jobs over the past
decade.157
The economic effects of air liberalization between the U.A.E.
and other nations have been markedly positive for those coun-
tries as well.158 For example, the air service liberalization be-
tween the U.A.E. and Germany in 1986 expanded the market by
nearly 167,000 passengers and generated 19.7% more traffic
than would have existed without liberalization, resulting in $152
million growth in Germany’s GDP and 2,600 new full-time jobs
for Germans.159 Similarly, in concert with rising oil prices, the
1998 liberalization between the U.A.E. and the U.K. produced a
fifty-nine percent boost in traffic and an increase of more than
one million passengers and created more than 18,700 jobs and
more than $1 billion increased GDP for the U.K.160 These posi-
tive outcomes further undermine the Partnership’s claims of im-
pending harm from the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ expansion.
Moreover, contrary to the Partnership’s prediction of a dra-
matic rise in unemployment, increased competition promotes
innovation and productivity and actually tends to improve em-
ployment rates in the long run.161 The effects of air travel liber-
alization are likely to boost widespread market growth.162 The
subsequent expansion of airlines, airports, and other secondary
aviation industries creates “a bigger cake [that] can be shared
between employees and shareholders.”163 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) found “an
empirical connection between strong competition in markets
for goods and services and better productivity and employment
outcomes.”164 This conclusion is strongly supported by evidence
157 Letter from Roger J. Dow, President & CEO, U.S. Travel Assoc., et al., to
Anthony Foxx, Sec’y of Transp., Dep’t of Transp., John Kerry, Sec’y of State,
Dep’t of State, & Penny Priztker, Sec’y of Commerce (June 11, 2015), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2015-0082-0615 [https://
perma.cc/72LT-MAZQ].
158 InterVISTAS 2015 Study, supra note 29, at 8–9.
159 InterVISTAS 2006 Study, supra note 2, at 42–43.
160 Id. at ES-17–18.
161 See Product Market Competition and Economic Performance, in 72 OECD ECO-
NOMIC OUTLOOK ch. 6, at 1, 7 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/competition/re-
form/2487682.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFG3-49V7].
162 Econ. Regulation Grp., CAP 749: The Effect of Liberalisation on Aviation Em-
ployment, U.K. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY i, v (Mar. 16, 2004), http://publicapps
.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP749.pdf [https://perma.cc/56GV-GX7F].
163 Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164 Product Market Competition and Economic Performance, supra note 161, at 1.
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from the U.K.165 For example, in response to European liberali-
zation, the demand for air travel in the U.K. rose dramatically,
prompting a corresponding forty percent increase in the num-
ber of aviation sector jobs between 1991 and 2001.166
Air travel deregulation can result in adjustment difficulties in-
itially as the market reacts to new competitive pressures on
wages and productivity levels.167 The prospect of a labor shake-
out often creates a political obstacle to product market deregu-
lation.168 However, it is important to recognize that these effects,
if any, are temporary.169 Ultimately, air travel liberalization stim-
ulates market growth and creates more jobs.170
3. The Disproportionate Benefits of the U.S.–Gulf Nations
Agreements
The Partnership also complains that the Gulf Nations agree-
ments confer immense benefits on the Gulf Nations’ carriers by
providing access to a highly lucrative market, while offering few
advantages to U.S. carriers given what it claims is “a low level of
demand for travel originating or terminating in the . . . Gulf
[Nations].”171 But the Partnership misunderstands the analysis
of airline industry competition.172 The proper inquiry does not
focus on the number of competitive air travel options between a
destination and a particular airline’s hub, but rather on the combi-
nation of options between a particular destination and a city or
state of origin.173 For example, a passenger seeking to travel from
New York to Mumbai has several options.174 She may book a
flight on Air India with a connection in Delhi, on American or
British Airways with a connection in London, on Emirates with a
165 Econ. Regulation Grp., CAP 749, supra note 162, at v.
166 Id. at 5–6. The substantial boost in employment occurred despite the rela-
tively higher labor costs in the U.K. as compared to other European nations. Id.
167 Product Market Competition and Economic Performance, supra note 161, at 6.
168 Id.
169 Id. Initial adjustment issues can be corrected more quickly by the imple-
mentation of training and job search programs. Id. at 7 n.13.
170 Econ. Regulation Grp., CAP 749, supra note 162, at v.
171 White Paper, supra note 8, at 3.
172 Edgeworth Econ., Empirical Investigation and Analysis of Economic Measures
Raised in “Restoring Open Skies: The Need to Address Subsidized Competition from State-




174 Id. ¶ 11.
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connection in Dubai, or a number of other options.175 Although
each available route connects through a different hub, they are
nonetheless competing for the same passenger.176 Where the
connection takes place is irrelevant.177 Thus, there is no merit to
the Partnership’s argument that the Gulf Nations disproportion-
ately benefit from their Open Skies agreements with the United
States.178
Moreover, even if the Partnership’s analysis of the compara-
tive benefits of the Gulf Nations agreements were correct, the
argument that each party must benefit equally from an Open
Skies covenant is equally invalid. In the process of shaping the
parameters of the U.S. Open Skies regime, the DOT carefully
considered whether each international agreement “[would]
necessarily produce benefits for U.S. interests of economic value
equal to those accruing to our bilateral partners.”179 The DOT
determined that comparative inequality of benefits should not
prevent the United States from entering into any Open Skies
agreement so long as its provisions were “consistent with [the
United States’] overall international aviation strategy and in the
public interest.”180 Thus, even if the Gulf Nations did reap a
greater economic benefit from the agreement than did the
United States, neither agreement would be considered less valid
as a result.
B. THE PARTNERSHIP CONFLATES U.S. INTERESTS
WITH THOSE OF THE BIG 3
As a major basis for its arguments, the White Paper cites a
fundamental concept of Open Skies policy of “ensuring that in
each individual case, the bilateral agreements negotiated under
the policy were consistent with U.S. interests.”181 The Partner-
ship claims that the Gulf Nations’ carriers’ activities are inconsis-
tent with the provisions of their Open Skies agreements because
they are harmful to U.S. interests. Specifically, the Partnership
asserts that the “subsidies” the Gulf Nations’ carriers receive cre-
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down prices as the Gulf Nations’ carriers continue to expand
their routes to the United States and will ultimately force U.S.
airlines to reduce or completely eliminate services to those
routes.182 This would in turn damage the U.S. domestic market
because of the mutually dependent nature of international and
domestic networks.183 The Big 3 and other parties to the Part-
nership also claim that Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar Airways are
displacing U.S. carriers on other international routes beyond
the Gulf Nations, including India, Asia, and Europe.184 In sup-
port of this point, the Partnership states that United, American,
and Delta each lost market share on their daily routes between
New York and Milan when Emirates launched a daily nonstop
flight on the same route.185 The Partnership warns that Emir-
ates’ entry has produced an excess capacity on the route that has
driven profit margins down to a level that cannot be sustained
long-term and will ultimately force at least one U.S. carrier out
of the route entirely and that many similar stories are sure to
follow.186
Notably absent from this list of impending disasters is any
meaningful connection to the U.S. economy and the individual
consumer. Even if its predictions are accurate, the Partnership is
primarily focused on the implications to U.S. carriers, particu-
larly United, American, and Delta.187 Although the Big 3 frame
their agenda as concern for the protection of U.S. interests, in
reality “the Big 3 Carriers seek to put their own narrow interests
before public benefit, consumer welfare, and competitive
markets.”188
But Open Skies agreements “exist to benefit the entire travel
industry and the broader U.S. economy, not just three air-
lines.”189 As noted by the president of the American Antitrust
Institute, the entry of foreign carriers into U.S. air travel markets
as a result of Open Skies agreements, “is decidedly in the inter-
est of competition and the U.S. consumer, even if it may threaten
182 Id. at 46.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 46–49.
185 Id. at 49.
186 Id. at 50.
187 See, e.g., id.
188 Etihad Airways Response, supra note 155, at 1, 3.
189 Roger Dow, Clearing the Air on Open Skies, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (July 10,
2015, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-dow/clearing-the-air-on-
open-_b_7771460.html [https://perma.cc/GN4G-SWGD].
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the Big 3’s private interest[s].”190 By opening hundreds of new des-
tinations for Americans and improving access into the United
States for millions of foreign travelers, Open Skies agreements
have unquestionably produced immense benefits for both U.S.
consumers and visiting international travelers.191 The preserva-
tion of Open Skies is “critical to thousands of businesses all
across America and millions of U.S. jobs that depend on interna-
tional travel.”192 Accordingly, in light of sound evidence that
Open Skies agreements ultimately benefit consumers and facili-
tate competition without depriving domestic carriers of the abil-
ity to compete,193 there is no reason to conclude that the
numerous dire outcomes projected by the Big 3 actually pose
any threat to the public interest that Open Skies agreements are
intended to protect.194
C. EQUALITY OF OUTCOME VS. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
The Partnership’s arguments are invalid because they seek
equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity. Equal-
ity of opportunity is one of the key tenets of Open Skies agree-
ments.195 Liberalization of international air travel is meant to
create a “level playing field” by allowing competition to regulate
the market.196 A level playing field means each nation has the
opportunity to utilize its own particular assets as effectively as
possible in a fair and open competitive environment.197 It does
not mean handicapping all the players so as to neutralize every
potential advantage.198
The concept of a level playing field is particularly significant
in the aviation sector.199 General trade theory suggests that a na-
tion’s comparative advantages in some markets may help to bal-
ance its disadvantages in others.200 Since the economic
contribution made by the stronger industries helps to compen-
190 Letter from Diana Moss, supra note 59, at 6 (emphasis added).
191 Etihad Airways Response, supra note 155, at 3.
192 Dow, supra note 189.
193 Letter from Diana Moss, supra note 59, at 2.
194 See “Open Skies,” Order No. 92-8-13, 1992 WL 204010, at *1 (U.S. Dep’t of
Transp. Aug. 5, 1992).
195 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 14, pmbl.;
Tretheway & Andriulaitis, supra note 14, at 6.
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sate for lower trade in weaker areas, a nation’s economic vitality
is determined by the aggregate benefit rather than by individual
markets.201 By contrast, air travel is largely isolated from other
markets because of the complex structure of international rules
and restrictions that continue to govern its operation.202 Balanc-
ing comparative strengths and weaknesses is more difficult.203 As
a result, the issue of a level playing field becomes more pressing
and its impact more acutely felt.204
These concerns can be alleviated by increased liberaliza-
tion.205 In a deregulated air travel market, nations are able to
benefit from their comparative advantages and disadvantages
within the aviation sector in the same way they would through
general trade negotiations.206 For example, Europe enjoys a
comparative advantage over the Gulf Nations in the form of su-
perior manufacturing technology and a more specialized
workforce.207 Conversely, as an international hub connecting
Europe with East Africa and South Asia, the Gulf Nations enjoy
a geographical advantage which has likely contributed to the
their carriers’ remarkable growth in recent years.208 But that
growth is largely facilitated by substantial orders for Airbus air-
craft, including the luxurious new double-decker A380s.209 And
without the demand from the Gulf Nations’ carriers, those
A380s probably would never have been built.210 Thus, by leverag-
ing their relative geographical advantage, the Gulf Nations’ air-
lines have allowed Europe to exercise its own relative advantage
in skilled labor and advanced technology.211
Moreover, due to the numerous factors influencing the indi-
vidual competitors within any given industry, the concept of an
absolutely level playing field exists only in theory.212 In the con-
text of international aviation, carriers are blessed or cursed with
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pletely equalize. For example, Canada enjoys a geographical ad-
vantage because of its location between major air travel markets
while New Zealand’s airlines must compete from a remote loca-
tion without access to a stream of international passengers.213 It
would be inappropriate for an air travel treaty to penalize Ca-
nada or confer extra benefits upon New Zealand based on fac-
tors that are inherent to their geographic locations.214 In
addition, large airlines might benefit from economies of scale
that a smaller carrier cannot achieve.215 But the solution for the
smaller airline is not a leg-up conferred by increased regulation,
but rather the opportunity to survive and grow, if at all, “by vir-
tue of flexibility and innovation.”216
Competition between carriers is also influenced by factors of
production.217 For example, the United States competes within
the economic reality that Canada has cheaper labor costs and
provides more comprehensive social services to its citizens.218
The cost of fuel varies widely among different countries based
upon natural resources or government taxation policies.219
Some governments levy higher airport charges or impose more
burdensome corporate taxes on their carriers than other coun-
tries.220 As one commentator pointed out, “[t]o attempt to level
all such comparative advantages to the logical conclusion, the
way to achieve a truly ‘level’ playing field would be by commodi-
tizing international air transport and locking it into the lowest
common denominator status quo.”221 Bringing all airlines up to
the highest possible level through competition is a much harder
task than forcing them all down to lowest common level by ex-
cessive regulation.222 Nonetheless, the established benefits of
213 Id. at 8.
214 Id.
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open market competition overwhelmingly outweigh the difficul-
ties associated with liberalization.223
Instead of working to maintain market dominance by their
own merits, the Partnership seeks to redefine a “level playing
field” as a tightly controlled arena where no competitor is al-
lowed to simply be better than another.224 This outcome-based
approach is antithetical to Open Skies policy, which is not
meant to ensure that every nose crosses the wire at the same
time but to promote airline competition for the benefit of the
public. Accordingly, the Obama Administration should decline
to adopt the Partnership’s initiatives because they are inconsis-
tent with the concept of equality of opportunity upon which
every Open Skies agreement is based.
D. THE ANSWER IS MORE COMPETITION,
NOT MORE RESTRICTIONS
Since its inception thirty decades ago, the United States has
not once terminated or imposed retroactive limitations on any
Open Skies agreement with another country and has fervently
encouraged nations all over the world to pursue liberalized in-
ternational air travel policies.225 In doing so, the United States
has created a strong tradition of upholding its Open Skies cove-
nants and actively promoting the furtherance of international
air travel liberalization.226
Breaking that tradition could have serious and lasting re-
sults.227 The President and CEO of FedEx Express pointed out
that “the Big 3’s demands would cause the U.S. to violate its
[O]pen [S]kies commitments, triggering possible retaliation
and casting doubt on U.S. support for [O]pen [S]kies.”228 The
measures advocated in the White Paper would clearly harm the
relationships the United States enjoys with the Gulf Nations,229
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compromise every one of the United States’ Open Skies rela-
tionships, and jeopardize all their attendant benefits to competi-
tion and consumers.230 And for what purpose? On the basis of
unsubstantiated injuries and a desire to eliminate their competi-
tion, the Big 3 are “seeking to rewrite decades of U.S. Open
Skies [p]olicy and potentially over 100 consummated Open
Skies agreements.”231 Reopening the U.S.–Gulf Nations Open
Skies agreements would send a message to the international avi-
ation community that “the United States wants Open Skies only
if its trading partners do not make vigorous use of those
rights.”232
According to Hawaiian Airlines President and CEO Mark
Dunkerley, the USAOS “believes that the United States should
honor its Open Skies commitments, which opens markets for
U.S. carriers, promotes competition on international and do-
mestic routes, and facilitates U.S. exports.”233 Members of the
European aviation market agree.234 Arnaud Feist, the CEO of
Brussels Airport and the President of ACI Europe acknowledged
the fact that fast-growing Gulf Nations’ carriers pose a challenge
to the global aviation market but suggested that attacking the
competition is the wrong solution.235 According to European
airport and tourism boards, “[f]ocusing [on] quality of out-
comes . . . interferes with market forces and hinders innova-
tion.”236 This approach artificially constrains air connectivity,
limits consumer choice, and “ultimately reduces wider eco-
nomic benefits.”237 Instead of reverting back to more restrictive
measures, the best way to respond to the challenge is to pro-
mote open competition and encourage the Gulf Nations’ carri-
ers to choose hubs in the United States.238
Without question, continuing to pursue liberalization policies
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lenging process.239 Efforts to remove restrictions on operations
are often constrained by the persistence of ownership rules.240
Nations and their airlines pursue deregulation measures on dif-
ferent timelines and at different paces.241 And as the Big 3 have
clearly demonstrated, industry participants whose market domi-
nance is threatened by open competition will “lobby vocifer-
ously” to protect their private interests.242 Despite these
difficulties, continued liberalization is not only possible; it is “an
essential part of improving the long-term health of the [airline]
industry.”243 Because of efforts by large stakeholders to advance
restrictive international policies contrary to the public good, in-
dustry regulators and national governments must take an active
leadership role in working to overcome these challenges.244 For
this reason, it is imperative that the U.S. government refuse the
Partnership’s demands and act affirmatively to protect U.S.
Open Skies agreements, both with the Gulf Nations and the rest
of the world.
E. THE LACK OF CLEAR DIRECTION FOR RENEGOTIATING THE
U.S.-GULF NATIONS AGREEMENTS
Finally, even if the Obama Administration wished to take up
the Partnership’s cause, the White Paper is devoid of any clear
proposals about how to proceed. Instead, it concludes with a
vague admonition that the government should “take steps to ad-
dress [the issue]” and “exercise [its] right to raise its concerns”
with the Gulf Nations.245 And if “taking steps” and “raising con-
cerns” should prove ineffective, the Partnership would have the
United States terminate the agreements and “apply the princi-
ples of comity and reciprocity” to determine what traffic rights,
if any, the United States should grant to the Gulf Nations’ carri-
ers on a piecemeal basis.246
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Obama Administration should reject the
Partnership’s demands and continue to honor the U.S. Open
Skies agreements with the Gulf Nations. The White Paper pub-
lished by the Partnership is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, it fails to prove that Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad
are unfairly subsidized by their nations’ governments. Second,
the present and future injuries asserted by the Big 3 are unsup-
ported by evidence and plainly reflect the narrow interests of
the Big 3 rather than the public good. Third, its claim that the
Gulf Nations’ agreements disproportionately benefit the Gulf
Nations is based upon a misapplication of the economic analysis
of airline industry competition.
Aside from the lack of persuasive evidence or reasoning in the
White Paper, there are strong policy considerations against
adopting the initiatives urged by the Partnership. Specifically,
reopening or terminating the Gulf Nations Open Skies agree-
ments would constitute a violation of those treaties, jeopardizing
all of the U.S. Open Skies agreements and its relationships with
other member nations. Instead of resorting to the harmful and
unproductive restrictions of the past, the U.S. government
should continue to actively support open competition by en-
couraging the Gulf Nations’ carriers to increase their activities
in the United States for the economic and social benefit of all
parties. Finally, the White Paper is ineffective because it fails to
set out any clear, actionable steps for the redress of the Gulf
Nations’ carriers’ alleged wrongs. For these reasons, the Obama
Administration should refuse to adopt the Big 3 agenda and in-
stead uphold the Open Skies treaties with the Gulf Nations.
